After the Tokyo 2+2, India–Japan defence cooperation must move to co-production
India and Japan have expanded defence cooperation, including joint training, technology development and potential shipbuilding.
On November 19, defence minister Rajnath Singh and external affairs minister S Jaishankar met their Japanese counterparts, Shinjiro Koizumi and Motegi Toshimitsu, in Tokyo for the fourth India–Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. The meeting came two days after the Quad leaders met in Manila, and its outcomes were notable even by the standards of a relationship that has grown steadily for two decades.

For the first time, Japan's Self-Defence Forces will conduct live-fire training in India, including with surface-to-ship missiles. India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Japan's Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) will deepen cooperation on missile and underwater technologies. Both sides agreed to explore joint naval shipbuilding and design, mine-countermeasure capabilities and closer information-sharing between their navies and air forces. They also voiced shared concern about economic coercion and the weaponisation of supply chains, and backed each other's bids for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.
Each of these steps matters. Together, they mark a shift in the relationship from strategic convergence to shared capability. The question now is whether the two countries can convert that intent into equipment, on time. That test, we argue, will be decided less at summit tables than within India's own procurement system.
The foundations were laid patiently. In 2014, Japan relaxed its long-standing restrictions on defence exports. A year later, India and Japan signed an agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technology. An agreement on reciprocal military logistics support followed in 2020. In August this year, the two defence ministers signed a memorandum on maritime security cooperation in New Delhi, covering maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and reciprocal ship repair.
The most concrete result so far is the UNICORN project, an integrated communications mast that reduces the radar visibility of warships. It is the first co-development project between the two countries, with Japan contributing design expertise and Bharat Electronics Limited responsible for production. India is only the second Asian country, after the Philippines, to receive defence technology from Japan. For a country that kept its defence industry closed to the world for decades, this is a significant expression of trust in India.
Yet the UNICORN project also shows where the challenge lies. A memorandum of implementation was signed in 2024. The project was formally announced at the annual summit in July 2026. At Tokyo, both sides expressed the hope that India would grant its formal approval, known as Acceptance of Necessity, by February 2027. That is nearly three years from agreement to the first formal procurement step, for a single mast.
Such timelines are not unusual in Indian defence acquisition. The procedures are designed to be careful, and that care has value. But they were not designed for co-development with a partner whose own industry is cautious about exports and sensitive to delays. Past experience offers a reminder. Discussions on India acquiring Japan's US-2 amphibious aircraft continued for years without leading to a contract.
Japan, meanwhile, is now a defence exporter with options. In 2025, Australia selected an upgraded version of Japan's Mogami-class frigate for its navy, Japan's most significant defence export to date. Japanese companies, which have limited experience of defence work abroad, will invest their time and technology where projects move predictably. If India wants to be the place where Japanese design meets large-scale production, a goal both governments have described as "Design with Japan, Make in India", it will need to offer that predictability.
There is also an opportunity that goes beyond defence. The Tokyo statement placed defence alongside semiconductors, critical minerals and undersea cables as areas for joint work on resilient supply chains. A defence partnership that builds trusted production capacity in India would strengthen all of these.
The most useful thing India can offer Japan now is not another framework but a faster route from agreement to contract. Government-to-government co-development projects with a trusted partner carry far less commercial risk than open-market purchases, yet they pass through much the same procedural stages. Recognising this difference within India's defence procurement rules, through a dedicated and time-bound track for such projects, would signal that New Delhi values speed as much as Tokyo values reliability.
The industrial base matters as much as the procedure. Japan's defence sector depends on dense networks of small, specialised suppliers, and that is where durable partnerships are built. If the proposed India–Japan Defence Industry Forum confines itself to large firms, it will reproduce the familiar pattern of headline agreements with thin follow-through. Bringing Indian component makers into Japanese supply chains would give the relationship roots that outlast any single project.
Ambition, too, should be sequenced. Joint naval shipbuilding is an attractive goal, but its credibility will rest on a first project that is modest, well defined and delivered on schedule, whether a mine-countermeasure vessel or a reciprocal ship-repair arrangement. One completed project would do more to build confidence on both sides than several new memoranda.
Finally, the commitments made in Tokyo deserve to be tracked as carefully as they were negotiated. The next 2+2, to be held in India, would be well served by beginning with an account of what has been delivered since November. Accountability of this kind is not a sign of mistrust between partners; it is how mature partnerships sustain political attention.
India and Japan have done the difficult diplomatic work. Their leaders share a view of the Indo-Pacific, their militaries train together and their scientists are beginning to design together. What remains is the practical work of turning agreements into assembly lines. If the next 2+2 can point to equipment rolling out of Indian shipyards and factories with Japanese technology inside, the partnership will have moved from promise to proof.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Komal Karwa, public policy researcher, Policy, Politics and Governance Foundation (PPGF) and South Asia Monitor.

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