Terror in J&K: A new name is not a new threat
A response triggered by every new claim of responsibility hands the rebranders the leverage they seek: the power to make each rebrand look like an escalation
The relative calm in South Kashmir over the past several months was interrupted on November 11, when two terrorists opened fire on a CRPF checkpoint near Mir Bazar in Kulgam district, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). One terrorist reportedly opened fire—the other provided cover—and wounded three security personnel. According to news reports, the gunmen slipped back into the dense-foliage areas towards Naupur. The attack coincided with J&K lieutenant-governor Manoj Sinha’s scheduled visit to the district to inaugurate the fourth Veshow Literary and Trade Festival 2026 at the Government Degree College, Kulgam. Within hours, a new group, Pasdaran-e-Hurriyat Kashmir, claimed responsibility. On November 16, security forces reported launching an operation against two Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists suspected of involvement in the attack, including Mohammad Lateef Bhat, believed to be the lone local LeT commander in the Valley. The suspected involvement of these terrorists steers the probe back towards an established, LeT-linked organisational network.

The significance of the Kulgam attack is underlined by the operational environment in which it took place. The Valley has seen a dip in the frequency, lethality, and visibility of terror activities, especially in the urban parts of Srinagar. While hit-and-run attacks, targeted killings, and attacks on security personnel have sporadically occurred, these have largely been contained to the rural districts adjoining the Pir Panjal range. The use of forested terrain and an operational strategy of a brief assault on security deployment, followed by a quick withdrawal, has been a consistent pattern in recent years.
The emergence of Pasdaran-e-Hurriyat Kashmir raises familiar questions about the proliferation of militant groups under new names in the Valley. An outfit’s inception in the Valley does not always indicate the formation of a new terror group; instead, it reveals an established pattern of organisational rebranding, in which existing groups adopt new identities to possibly befog attribution and cultivate the perception of a widening terror ecosystem. The Kulgam attack underlines how this plays out. A new brand can claim an attack; however, the identification of the suspect(s) involved may ultimately steer authorities back to existing terror infrastructure.
After the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, many new outfit names appeared in the terror landscape in J&K. The Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be the largest such group; the People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF); and Kashmir Tigers prominently stood out and occupied the space presented as having been vacated by LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen. The names reveal the perception these outfits seek to create: A language of resistance replaced explicitly religious nomenclature, offering the organisations fresh political vocabulary to claim attacks.
The TRF was critical to this transition, and its emergence enabled Pakistan’s military-jihadi complex (MJC) to establish itself as a resistance force rooted in the Kashmir cause. It further served to maintain deniability by creating distance between the outfit claiming attacks and the established terror infrastructure that the Indian security establishment was familiar with. And, more for the international audience, the rebranding was likely intended to give militancy a more indigenous appearance, even as operational tactics and associations were attributed to the LeT. This enabled old outfits to gain from a different political vocabulary without relinquishing the existing operational networks.
For a terror group, this strategy brings several advantages. New names often make it more challenging to establish organisational continuity, presenting newer knots to untie for the security establishment that seeks to counter it. This means establishing whether the group represents a new formation, a splinter faction, an existing network operating under a different identity, or a propaganda label. Claims by multiple outfits can imply a wider social and geographical presence than the actual number of operational cadres would indicate. And finally, it could offer an escape from reputational costs to evade association with designated Pakistan-based terror groups.
This raises the question whether changing names helps already-proscribed terror groups escape legal consequences. The answer is no—at least not in the case of TRF. The Union home ministry proscribed TRF as a terrorist outfit under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in January 2023. The notification also extended the designation to its various manifestations, front outfits, and aliases. Under Section 41 of the UAPA, an association does not cease to exist simply because it has formally dissolved or rebranded, provided any combination or coordination for that association continues among any of its members. The change in nomenclature is unlikely to be useful for evading legal consequences.
The challenge lies more in the evidentiary domain—where authorities are tasked with establishing common membership, command structure, financial channels, handlers, and operational continuity. This is what should shape the State’s response. Since a new name does not change who is responsible, it should not change how India calibrates its reaction.
Even as the threshold for Indian retaliation against Pakistan’s MJC has consistently been lowered from 2016 to 2019 and, more recently, in 2025, strategic ambiguity has been a useful asset to New Delhi. It has preserved the ability to determine the timing, scale, and nature of a response, despite the stated claim of not differentiating between Pakistan-based groups and its alleged handlers in the Pakistani military. That ambiguity is valuable only if it is exercised deliberately. A response triggered by every new claim of responsibility would hand the rebranders precisely the leverage they seek: the power to make each rebrand look like an escalation. Attacks like Kulgam call for pursuit of the known network through the courts and security grid, not a fresh round of strategic signalling. The same logic applies to diplomacy. India should retain the ability to distinguish between its national security imperatives and the scope for functional, cooperative engagement where interests permit.
Aishwaria Sonavane is research analyst (Pakistan Desk), Geostrategy Programme, Takshashila Institution.The views expressed are personal

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